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Formula One - Supreme Court - Permanent Establishment

Formula One – A formula that went wrong!

In this post, I do not intend to go into the factual matrix of the case, coming as it does, more than 9 months after the decision. The post is prompted by the earlier post on AAR in Production Resource Group – a ruling that followed the Supreme Court in FOWC.

Here, you will find judgements, opinions and commentaries referred by the Supreme Court in concluding that even a 3 day racing ( preceded by a week and succeeded by 2 weeks) can constitute a PE.  Comments and Analysis are at the end!

Philip Baker

The [PE] concept marks the dividing line for businesses between merely trading with a country and trading in that country; if an enterprise has a PE, its presence in a country is sufficiently substantial that it is trading in the country.
In the first type of PE, i.e. associated permanent establishments, primary requirement is that there must be a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. It entails two requirements which need to be fulfilled: (a) there must be a business of an enterprise of a Contracting State; and (b) PE must be a fixed place of business, i.e. a place which is at the disposal of the enterprise. It is universally accepted that for ascertaining whether there is a fixed place or not, PE must have three characteristics: stability, productivity and dependence. Further, fixed place of business connotes existence of a physical location which is at the disposal of the enterprise through which the business is carried on.
Some of the examples of fixed place of business given by Baker are the following:
The place of business must be fixed and permanent. Thus, a shed which had been rented for thirteen years for storing and preparing hides was held to constitute a PE. Similarly, a writer's study has been held to constitute a PE. A stand at a trade fair, occupied regularly for three weeks a year, through which the enterprise obtained contracts for a significant part of its annual sales, has also been held to constitute a PE. A temporary restaurant operated in a mirror tent at a Dutch flower show for a period of seven months was held to constitute a PE. An office, on the other hand, possession of a mailing address in a state - without an office, telephone listing or bank account - has been held not to constitute a PE. The mere supply of skilled labour to work in a country did not give rise to a PE of the company supplying the labour. A drilling rig which, although anchored while in operation, was moved to a new site every few months, has been held not to constitute a PE. Similarly, a remotely operated vessel which was used to inspect and repair submarine pipelines was held not to constitute a PE because a moving vessel is not a fixed place of business.
The principal test, in order to ascertain as to whether an establishment has a fixed place of business or not, is that such physically located premises have to be ‘at the disposal’ of the enterprise. For this purpose, it is not necessary that the premises are owned or even rented by the enterprise. It will be sufficient if the premises are put at the disposal of the enterprise. However, merely giving access to such a place to the enterprise for the purposes of the project would not suffice. The place would be treated as 'at the disposal' of the enterprise when the enterprise has right to use the said place and has control thereupon.
Klaus Vogel
Interpreting the OECD Article 5 pertaining to PE, Klaus Vogel has remarked that insofar as the term 'business' is concerned, it is broad, vague and of little relevance for the PE definition. According to him, the crucial element is the term 'place'. Importance of the term 'place' is explained by him in the following manner:
"In conjunction with the attribute 'fixed', the requirement of a place reflects the strong link between the land and the taxing powers of the State. This territorial link serves as the basis not only for the distributive rules which are tied to the existence of PE but also for a considerable number of other distributive rules and, above all, for the assignment of a person to either Contracting State on the basis of residence (Article 1, read in conjunction with Article 4 OECD and UN MC)."
Vogel defines 'place' as under:
"A place is a certain amount of space within the soil or on the soil. This understanding of place as a three-dimensional zone rather than a single point on the earth can be derived from the French Version ('installation fixe') as well as the term 'establishment'. As a rule, this zone is based on a certain area in, on, or above the surface of the earth. Rooms or technical equipment above the soil may quality as a PE only if they are fixed on the soil. This requirement, however, stems from the term 'fixed' rather than the term 'place', given that a place (or space) does not necessarily consist of a piece of land. On the contrary, the term 'establishment' makes clear that it is not the soil as such which is the PE but that the PE is constituted by a tangible facility as distinct from the soil. This is particularly evident from the French version of Article 5(1) OECD MC which uses the term 'installation' instead of 'place'.
The term 'place' is used to define the term 'establishment'. Therefore, 'place' includes all tangible assets used for carrying on the business, but one such tangible asset can be sufficient. The characterization of such assets under private law as real property rather than personal property (in common law countries) or immovable rather than movable property (in civil law countries) is not authoritative. It is rather the context (including, above all, the terms 'fixed'/'fixe'), as well as the object and purpose of Article 5 OECD and UN MC itself, in the light of which the term 'place' needs to be interpreted. This approach, which follows from the general rules on treaty interpretation, gives a certain leeway for including movable property in the understanding of 'place' and, therefore, the assume a PE once such property has been 'fixed' to the soil.
For example, a work bench in a caravan, restaurants on permanently anchored river boats, steady oil rigs, or a transformator or generator on board a former railway wagon qualify as places (and may also be 'fixed').
In contrast, purely intangible property cannot qualify in any case. In particular, rights such a participations in a corporation, claims, bundles of claims (like bank accounts), any other type of intangible property (patents, software, trademarks etc.) or intangible economic assets (a regular clientele or the goodwill of an enterprise) do not in themselves constitute a PE. They can only form part of PE constituted otherwise. Likewise, an internet website (being a combination of software and other electronic data) does not constitute tangible property and, therefore, does not constitute a PE.
Neither does the mere incorporation of a company in a Contracting State in itself constitute a PE of the company in that State. Where a company has its seat, according to its by-laws and/or registration, in State A while the POEM is situated in State B, this company will usually be liable to tax on the basis of its worldwide income in both Contracting States under their respective domestic tax law. Under the A-B treaty, however, the company will be regarded as a resident of State B only (Article 4(3) OECD and UN MC). In the absence of both actual facilities and a dependent agent in State A, income of this company will be taxable only in State B under the 1st sentence of Article 7(1) OECD and UN MC.
There is no minimum size of the piece of land. Where the qualifying business activities consist (in full or in part) of human activities by the taxpayer, his employees or representatives, the mere space needed for the physical presence of these individuals is not sufficient (if it were sufficient, Article 5(5) OECD MC and Article 5(5)(a) UN MC and the notion of agent PEs were superfluous). This can be illustrated by the example of a salesman who regularly visits a major customer to take orders, and conducts meetings in the purchasing director's office. The OECD MC Comm. has convincingly denied the existence of a PE, based on the implicit understanding that the relevant geographical unit is not just the chair where the salesman sits, but the entire office of the customer, and the office is not at the disposal of the enterprise for which the salesman is working.
Vogel has also emphasised that the place of business qualifies only if the place is 'at the disposal' of the enterprise. According to him, the enterprise will not be able to use the place of business as an instrument for carrying on its business unless it controls the place of business to a considerable extent. He hastens to add that there are no absolute standards for the modalities and intensity of control. Rather, the standards depend on the type of business activity at issue. According to him, 'disposal' is the power (or a certain fraction thereof) to use the place of business directly.
Some of the instances given by Vogel in this behalf, of relative standards of control, are as under:
The degree of control depends on the type of business activity that the taxpayer carries on. It is therefore not necessary that the taxpayer is able to exclude others from entering or using the POB.
The painter example in the OECD MC Comm. (no. 4.5 OECD MC Comm. on Article 5) (however questionable it might be with regard to the functional integration test) suggests that the type and extent of control need not exceed the level of what is required for the specific type of activity which is determined by the concrete business.
By contrast, in the case of a self-employed engineer who had free access to his customer's premises to perform the services required by his contract, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the engineer had no control because he had access only during the customer's regular office hours and was not entitled to carry on businesses of his own on the premises.
Similarly, a Special Bench of Delhi's Income Tax Appellate Tribunal denied the existence of a PE in the case of Ericsson. The Tribunal held that it was not sufficient that Ericsson's employees had access to the premises of Indian mobile phone providers to deliver the hardware, software and know-how required for operating a network. By contrast, in the case of a competing enterprise, the Bench did assume an Indian PE because the employees of that enterprise (unlike Ericsson's) had exercised other businesses of their employer.
The OECD MC shows a paramount tendency (though no strict rule) that PEs should be treated like subsidiaries (cf. Article 24(3) OECD and UN MC), and that facilities of a subsidiary would rarely been unusable outside the office hours of one of its customers (i.e. a third person), the view of the two courts is still more convincing.
Along these lines, a POB will usually exist only where the taxpayer is free to use the POB:
- at any time of his own choice;- for work relating to more than one customer; and- for his internal administrative and bureaucratic work.
In all, the taxpayer will usually be regarded as controlling the POB only where he can employ it at his discretion. This does not imply that the standards of the control test should not be flexible and adaptive. Generally, the less invasive the activities are, and the more they allow a parallel use of the same POB by other persons, the lower are the requirements under the control test. There are, however, a number of traditional PEs which by their nature require an exclusive use of the POB by only one taxpayer and/or his personnel. A small workshop (cf. Article 5(2)(e) OECD and UN MC) of 10 or 12 square meters can hardly be used by more than one person. The same holds true for a room where the taxpayer runs a noisy machine.
OECD Commentary:
OECD commentary on Model Tax Convention mentions that a general definition of the term 'PE' brings out its essential characteristics, i.e. a distinct "situs", a "fixed place of business". This definition, therefore, contains the following conditions:
- the existence of a "place of business", i.e. a facility such as premises or, in certain instances, machinery or equipment.
- this place of business must be "fixed", i.e. it must be established at a distinct place with a certain degree of permanence;
- the carrying on of the business of the enterprise through this fixed place of business. This means usually that persons who, in one way or another, are dependent on the enterprise (personnel) conduct the business of the enterprise in the State in which the fixed place is situated.
The term "place of business" is explained as covering any premises, facilities or installations used for carrying on the business of the enterprise whether or not they are used exclusively for that purpose. It is clarified that a place of business may also exist where no premises are available or required for carrying on the business of the enterprise and it simply has a certain amount of space at its disposal. Further, it is immaterial whether the premises, facilities or installations are owned or rented by or are otherwise at the disposal of the enterprise. A certain amount of space at the disposal of the enterprise which is used for business activities is sufficient to constitute a place of business. No formal legal right to use that place is required. Thus, where an enterprise illegally occupies a certain location where it carries on its business, that would also constitute a PE.
OECD examples where premises are treated at the disposal of the enterprise and, therefore, constitute PE are:  a place of business may thus be constituted by a pitch in a market place, or by a certain permanently used area in a customs depot (e.g. for the storage of dutiable goods). Again the place of business may be situated in the business facilities of another enterprise. This may be the case for instance where the foreign enterprise has at its constant disposal certain premises or a part thereof owned by the other enterprise. At the same time, it is also clarified that the mere presence of an enterprise at a particular location does not necessarily mean that the location is at the disposal of that enterprise.
The OECD commentary gives as many as four examples where location will not be treated at the disposal of the enterprise. These are:
(a) The first example is that of a salesman who regularly visits a major customer to take orders and meets the purchasing director in his office to do so. In that case, the customer's premises are not at the disposal of the enterprise for which the salesman is working and therefore do not constitute a fixed place of business through which the business of that enterprise is carried on (depending on the circumstances, however, paragraph 5 could apply to deem a permanent establishment to exist). b) Second example is that of an employee of a company who, for a long period of time, is allowed to use an office in the headquarters of another company (e.g. a newly acquired subsidiary) in order to ensure that the latter company complies with its obligations under contracts concluded with the former company. In that case, the employee is carrying on activities related to the business of the former company and the office that is at his disposal at the headquarters of the other company will constitute a permanent establishment of his employer, provided that the office is at his disposal for a sufficiently long period of time so as to constitute a "fixed place of business" (see paragraphs 6 to 6.3) and that the activities that are performed there go beyond the activities referred to in paragraph 4 of the Article. (c) The third example is that of a road transportation enterprise which would use a delivery dock at a customer's warehouse every day for a number of years for the purpose of delivering goods purchased by that customer. In that case, the presence of the road transportation enterprise at the delivery dock would be so limited that that enterprise could not consider that place as being at its disposal so as to constitute a permanent establishment of that enterprise. (d) Fourth example is that of a painter, who, for two years, spends three days a week in the large office building of its main client. In that case, the presence of the painter in that office building where he is performing the most important functions of his business (i.e. painting) constitute a permanent establishment of that painter.
It also states that the words 'through which' must be given a wide meaning so as to apply to any situation where business activities are carried on at a particular location which is at the disposal of the enterprise for that purpose. For this reason, an enterprise engaged in paving a road will be considered to be carrying on its business 'through' the location where this activity takes place.
 CIT v. Vishakapatnam Port Trust  
"The words 'permanent establishment' postulate the existence of a substantial element of an enduring or permanent nature of a foreign enterprise in another country which can be attributed to a fixed place of business in that country. It should be of such a nature that it would amount to a virtual projection of the foreign enterprise of one country into the soil of another country."
Universal Furniture Ind. AB v. Government of Norway Case No. 99-00421, dated 19-12- 1999 :
A Swedish company sold furniture abroad that was assembled in Sweden. It hired an individual tax resident of Norway to look after its sales in Norway, including sales to a Swedish company, which used to compensate him for use of a phone and other facilities. Later, the company discontinued such payments and increased his salary. The Norwegian tax authorities said that the Swedish company had its place of business in Norway. The Norwegian court agreed, holding that the salesman's house amounted to a place of business: it was sufficient that the Swedish Company had a place at its disposal, i.e the Norwegian individual's home, which could be regarded as 'fixed'.
Joseph Fowler v. Her Majesty the Queen 1990 (2) CTC 235:
The issue was whether a United States tax resident individual who used to visit and sell his wares in a camper trailer, in fairs, for a number of years had a fixed place of business in Canada. The fairs used to be once a year, approximately for three weeks each.
The court observed that the nature of the individual's business was such that he held sales in similar fares, for duration of two or three weeks, in two other locales in the United States. The court held that conceptually, the place was one of business, notwithstanding the short duration, because it amounted to a place of management or a branch having regard to peculiarities of the business.
Comments and Analysis
3 days too short for a PE?  Though the decision may have upset those who thought a 3-day affair could never have created a PE, the Delhi High Court decision overruling the AAR and the subsequent judgement of the Supreme Court in FOWC shows how one needs to contextualise the duration to the nature and requirement of business in each case.   Even complicated and carefully laid out arrangements can fail when one goes to the root of the matter.   In coming to its conclusion, the Apex Court negatived the arguments that FOWC never had any place of business at its disposal, did not carry on any business, never had exclusive control over the Circuit and in any case, possession of a place for 3 days could not constitute a PE.  It was clearly a case of ‘substance over form’, and discovering how FOWC and affiliates, through a web of agreements, exercised defacto control over the racing. It will be interesting to watch if other jurisdictions that have so far allowed Formula One go scot free ( read ' tax free') will take a fresh view of things!  

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